Each electronic (electric) device generates electromagnetic emissions during its operation. Most often these emissions are generated unintentionally and they are radiated into the surrounding space in an uncontrolled way. In the case of significant levels of these emissions, they can disturb the operation of other devices or can be used as typical radio emissions. If the nature of their changes corresponds to the processed information occurring in a form of electric signals, the mentioned emissions can be a basis for effective realization of electromagnetic infiltration processes. Most often, these emissions are classified in laboratory conditions using anechoic chambers. Inside such chambers there are not additional sources of emissions that would increase the level of electromagnetic protection through disturbance of sensitive emissions. The sensitive emissions have distinctive features corresponding to the processed information. Using these emissions, the reconstruction of primary information is possible. This article presents the results of tests of a laser printer with a two-diode laser system, operated in an open space and in office rooms, outside the anechoic chamber.
Introduction
The phenomenon of electromagnetic penetration of information constitutes a great risk, especially when we consider the processing of classified information. Classified information (e.g., top secret, secret, confidential, restricted, or other very important material) is material that we claim is sensitive information that requires protection of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. The possibility of effective usage of sensitive emissions has been proved multiple times, both in the case of radiated emissions [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] and conducted emissions [10, 11] . It has been presented that sources in the form of graphical lines (graphic card of the central processing unit, monitors, laser of the laser printer) are the most effective sources for the noninvasive process of acquisition of information. This enables the possibility of reconstruction of the data by someone in an understandable form. The form is images that contain the aforementioned data. However, the measurement conditions used in the literature deviate from reality. For instance, if an anechoic chamber is used as a measurement environment, undesirable radiated emissions that can "cover" emissions correlated with the information are efficiently eliminated [12] [13] [14] .
Power filters installed in the chamber fulfill an analogous function. In such conditions the range of leakage of information is very large. The electromagnetic environment inside the anechoic chamber allows to get to know the characteristics of many sources of electromagnetic emissions. Earlier studies and obtained results of analyses showed the possibility of shaping emission sources. Selected results were presented in [15] . Another issue is the phenomenon of electromagnetic infiltration in real conditions, in an environment where additional sources of electromagnetic disturbance exist. Therefore, a question arises: does the risk from electromagnetic infiltration of information exist in real conditions, and in particular in office rooms?
Moreover, we are often confronted with questions associated with the electromagnetic safety of commercial devices (a commercial device is a device offered on the market without trade embargo in contrast to a special device such as the so-called TEMPEST device) and the necessity to apply modified devices of a very high purchase cost. The cost oscillates between six and eight thousand euros. It is not a normal price. Using commercial devices is an option if they are appropriately selected. This selection is based on comparison of measured emissions of these devices with appropriate requirements for protection of classified information. According to fulfillment of the requirements the selected device could be allowed to process classified information. Otherwise, the device is rejected. Free choice of a commercial device and its usage in classified information systems poses an information leakage risk [16] [17] [18] [19] .
Research methodology
In order to demonstrate the danger associated with sensitive emissions in real conditions, a series of tests in a so-called open space and office rooms were carried out, in which a typical laser printer with a laser system based on two diodes was used. This danger is a very important issue because sensitive emissions could propagate in an uncontrolled way and they could be used for noninvasive data acquisition. Distances of propagation of sensitive emissions could be very significant.
The chosen printer was characterized by slightly higher levels of electromagnetic emissions, which is not an isolated phenomenon. It is also possible to select one of several devices characterized by very low levels of sensitive emissions. However, the selection is very difficult and time-consuming, but only then can the chosen commercial device be used to organize a workstation for the processing of protected information. The cause of loss of information could be incorrect selection of the device.
At present, laser systems of printers first of all are based on two-diode systems, which can be observed in Figure 1 . The systems are controlled by serial signals. The phenomenon is very positive from the electromagnetic infiltration process point of view. Each of the diodes is stimulated by an independent signal, the structure of which varies with a change in the print mode. Of course, LED slat systems are also used. However, such a solution is not considered. The possibilities of using printers with LED slats are described in [8] . It was pointed out that LED slat systems are resistant to electromagnetic infiltration processes.
Appropriate tests were carried out for different distances between the antenna and laser printer during printing of the same text, as shown in Figure 2 . The text was written using capital and lowercase letters of Arial font, lowercase letters of Symmetrical Safe font, Asymmetrical Safe font, and Symmetrical Safe font with a constant height [20] . The characters of the mentioned fonts were written without spaces and with single spaces. The size of the used font was 14 points.
The obtained results confirmed that the phenomenon of so-called leakage of information not only exists in isolated electromagnetic environments (e.g., anechoic chamber, Figure 3 ) [8] ; the phenomenon can also exist in typical working environments. Taking into account the possibility of an "eavesdropping" workstation right behind the wall of an office room, as shown in Figure 4 , in which protected information is processed, the phenomenon of electromagnetic eavesdropping creates a danger in most cases [16] . Special devices have additional constructional solutions. They have to limit the level of electromagnetic emissions correlated with processed information [16] . These solutions are power filters, signal filters, electromagnetic shields and gaskets, and others [18] . These devices are very expensive. However, we can use commercial equipment, but we have to select the appropriate operation mode of such devices. The operation mode has to be an ineffective source of unwanted emissions. Earlier examinations of emission sources were carried out for different types of screens. Different resolutions of displayed images on the screens were tested from the point of view of a range of leakage of information [2] . In this case, it was shown that sensitive emissions exist and they are measured in a distance of about 20 m from the source of emissions in the office space and 30 m in the open area. Such studies were not carried out for printers. In particular, the impact of printing quality mode on the range of leakage of information was not tested.
Selection of frequencies and measurement bandwidths of sensitive emissions is dependent on the physical size of the equipment and required signal-to-noise ratio, respectively. If the structure or layout of a device provides good antenna characteristics, the signals will use the parasitic antenna and radiate from the system into the air. The bandwidth of a sensitive emission measurement also has to be small enough to suppress the powerful signals from neighboring signal sources and large enough for the observed data rate.
The test signal bandwidth was determined according to the following formula:
where: BW -the signal bandwidth for printing of one picture point (Hz);
W -the width of the printing area (inches);
L-the length of the printing area (inches);
dpi -the printing resolution (the number of dots per inch);
t-the printing time of the one page (seconds).
We have to notice that the above formula only approximates the value of signal bandwidth. Very often we obtain better results for smaller values of signal bandwidth. In our case we had: W = 6.27 in, L = 9.69 in, dpi = 600, and t = 2 s. Then BW ≈ 10 MHz.
During the tests the sensitive emissions were measured in bandwidths equal to 1 MHz, 2 MHz, and 5 MHz, in the frequency range from 2 MHz to 1 GHz [6, 8, 19] . The frequency range from 2 MHz to 1 GHz was selected as a result of many years of experiences in the testing of laser printers and screens. Figure 6 , which was certified for electromagnetic safety. The reason for this choice was the fact that a typical computer has higher levels of electromagnetic emissions than the TEMPEST computer [6, 14] . These emissions can "cover" the reveal emissions. Then the carrying out of the electromagnetic infiltration process becomes impossible.
The sensitive emissions strongly correlating with the printed document were recorded at frequencies of 72 MHz, 73 MHz, and 170 MHz, in the distance of r = 8, 12, and 15 m for office rooms, as shown in Figure 7 , and r = 10, 15, 20, and 25 m for the open space. The receiving antenna was placed in the gate of the anechoic chamber and the printer was placed outside of the chamber, as shown in Figure 8 . The printing of data was carried out for 600 dpi × 600 dpi resolution with Eco printing mode. The analysis of sensitive data from the laser printer, depending on the distance of the reception, was based on the visual analysis of reconstructed images. This is the most frequently used method in the case of electromagnetic infiltration of video tracks of information processing devices.
The Eco printing mode was selected due to its high susceptibility to electromagnetic infiltration [1, 2] . We very often use the printing mode to save printing material, especially toner powder. The source of sensitive emissions corresponding to the Eco printing (quality) mode is very effective. Its distinctive features are very strong. However, this does not mean that the printing using the Best option is safe. The infiltration susceptibility of a printing device mainly depends on a laser diode control solution applied by the producer. Thus, in one type of devices the Best printing mode may be more susceptible to electromagnetic eavesdropping (higher dynamics of the useful signal changes, as shown in Figure 9a ), and in another type this option may be characterized by significant resistance [8] (lower dynamics of the useful signal changes, as shown in Figure 9b ). The useful signal is an electric signal that forces the operation of the two-diode laser system of the printer. The signal has distinctive features connected with processed (printed) information and the signal could be a source of sensitive emissions. Figure 9 shows some examples of useful signals for the Best printing mode. The high dynamics of changes of signal amplitude, as shown in Figure 9a , make the source of the unwanted emissions very effective. The filling of the printed line is point by point. This means that the line consists of single points separated by nonprinted points. In this case, the printed line has many distinctive features. This phenomenon is favorable for the electromagnetic infiltration process. These features allow to reproduce the printed data line by line. Each point of the line is identified by the beginning and the end of the pulse for each point at the output of the information infiltration channel (IIC), which has the characteristics of a high-pass filter [4, 10, 13] . The printing with the Best mode can be implemented completely differently. An example is shown in Figure 8b . In this case, the voltage amplitude of the signal corresponding to the printed line is constant. There is a lack of fast changes of voltage amplitude. The printed line does not have many distinctive features. At the output of the IIC, each printed line is identified by the beginning and the end of a pulse, for which the duration corresponds to the length of the printed line. This phenomenon is not favorable for the electromagnetic infiltration process. The characteristics of sensitive emission are susceptible to electromagnetic disturbance. Therefore, does printing quality impact the change of electromagnetic infiltration capability? Does it directly translate into the quality of recreated images? The obtained data are presented below.
Test results

Range of leakage of information
Attention should be drawn to a very important aspect: the possibility of recoding and further digital processing of the reconstructed images. As mentioned before, the possibility of presenting retrieved data in a graphical form understandable for humans transforms the sources to video lines of "eavesdropped" devices. However, there are differences between the means of control of end devices (emission sources) that visualize the processed data.
In the case of screens we deal with the repetition of images [2, 4, 6] , which allows for the recording of several and even several dozens of realizations of disclosing emission signals, corresponding to nearly the same original image. "Eavesdropping" of printing devices does not provide information about several copies of the same pages of printed data. The phenomenon of repetition of information is very important for further processing of visualized images that are very noisy [21, 22] , in the case of which a so-called images summing process could be applied. This method significantly improves the value of the signal-to-noise ratio [23, 24] . Unfortunately, this method is significantly limited in the case of printing devices since the data printing process may be accompanied by a disclosing emission that corresponds to a single identical page only unless a serial printing of a single page is carried out.
The other problem is the division of recorded realizations into time intervals corresponding to particular pages of the printout [1, 3, 8] . In the case of printers, when the beginning of the printout of subsequent pages does not have to occur in strictly specified times, the designation of the beginnings of pages in order to sum them is very difficult. In the case of a screen, in which a set refresh frequency occurs, the issue of synchronization of reconstructed images does not cause significant problems. Figures 10 and 11 contain the test results in the form of images retrieved from emissions recorded in an open space and in office rooms, respectively. The increase of measuring distance r from the printing device deteriorates the perception features of obtained images. Nevertheless, as seen from Figure 12 , the levels of occurring sensitive emissions are high enough to allow their graphical reproduction [23, [25] [26] [27] . Moreover, they become legible, especially in the case of use of the Arial font. Characters of safe fonts act as protection against electromagnetic infiltration, which can be observed in Figures 9 and 11 . The majority of measured electromagnetic emissions, which exceed the level of environmental disturbances occurring in an anechoic chamber, are not correlated with the processed information [16] . These are emissions that are generated as a result of operation of elements that take part in the document printing. These include the stepper motors, heater, and power supply circuits. In many cases, from the electromagnetic protection point of view, they are beneficial since they constitute a "masking" element for sensitive emissions, which may efficiently counteract the electromagnetic infiltration process. Therefore, different designs of commercial devices, aiming to adapt those devices for processing of classified information, must be applied with great sensitivity. The sources of so-called typical emissions must not be modified, since their elimination may "uncover" the undesirable emissions and the level of sensitivity of a device will unexpectedly increase.
Printing mode of laser printer and effectiveness of electromagnetic eavesdropping
The level of efficiency of electromagnetic eavesdropping and its range strongly depend on the printing mode of the printing device [8] . In particular, the printer provides two printing quality modes: Eco and Best. The printing mode of the laser system depends on devices specifications, e.g., firmware, and in the system of two laser diodes it may be implemented through:
− The operation of two laser diodes stimulated by a pulse signal (variation of voltage amplitude of the useful signal is very fast; as a result, we can observe not only vertical and diagonal edges of reconstructed elements, but we see complete signs), printing each line of the image -the Best printing mode as shown in Figure 13a . The revealed emission is not susceptible to electromagnetic disturbance. The range of leakage of information is wide. − The operation of a single diode stimulated by a pulse signal (variation of voltage amplitude of the useful signal is very fast; as a result, we can observe not only vertical and diagonal edges of reconstructed elements, but we see complete signs), printing every line of the image -the Eco printing mode as shown in Figure 13c . At the output of the IIC each reconstructed line is identified as a sequence of points. They are strong distinctive features, which are not susceptible to electromagnetic disturbance. The range of leakage of information is big.
The selection of the printing mode simultaneously shapes the nature of the source of undesired emissions. The tests demonstrate that the most efficient source of such emissions is the operation of one or two diodes when the variation of the voltage amplitude of the useful signal is very fast. When the voltage amplitude of the useful signal is almost constant, the source of the sensitive emission is not effective from the electromagnetic eavesdropping point of view, as shown in Figure 13b .
As a result of the impact of the IIC of radiation type, only vertical and diagonal edges of graphical elements are displayed in a form of single points as displayed every second line in Figure 14 . In an anechoic chamber, the increase of the distance of electromagnetic eavesdropping to 7-8 m prevents execution of an efficient process of electromagnetic infiltration. The values of the pixels' amplitudes associated with single points (for the distance of 1 m), which outline the vertical and diagonal edges of the graphical elements, are significantly reduced [10, 11] . As a result, they are unnoticeable, and acquiring information using a noninvasive method becomes impossible. Besides, the office rooms reduce the r distance several meters, to approximately 2-3 m.
Conclusions
The article presents the results of tests of sensitive emissions measured for different distances r . The tests were carried out for different electromagnetic environments: an open space and office rooms. The "eavesdropped" device was a printer with two-diode laser system.
The obtained results of the tests confirmed the existing risk associated with the electromagnetic infiltration in an environment, described as follows: − with additional electromagnetic emission sources and − obstacles that deteriorate the propagation properties, like building walls and metal structures.
Obstacles may reduce the efficiency of noninvasive acquisition of information. The quality of reproduced images demonstrates that distances r = 25 m and r = 12 m for the open space and the office rooms do not have to be obstacles in the electromagnetic infiltration process.
However, the level of effectiveness of the process strongly depends on the type of the device that processes the data and its efficiency as a source of undesirable emissions. The reason for that is the fact that there are commercial device readouts of data from reproduced images in very restricted ranges even for r = 1 m as seen from Figure 15 . The data included in the image are not legible and they are very weakly distinguishable. This image shows that we could select a device for which levels of sensitive emissions could be lower. Then the range of leakage of information is shorter. However, this situation does not exist often.
The obtained results show that the risk connected with the leakage of information exists in both the open area and space offices. The level of the risk depends on the character of the sensitive emission source. The range of the leakage of information is difficult to determine. It particularly depends on the construction of walls and other elements that disturb the electromagnetic wave. Therefore, determining the optimum distance between a printer and an eavesdropping workstation for different electromagnetic environments is not easy.
